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FOREWORD: THE MEANINGS OF
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
LEE E. TEITELBAUM*

The following symposium is one of many colloquia called to
celebrate the International Year of the Child. This occasion, according to the United Nations Declaration establishing it,' is intended to
provide "a framework for advocacy on behalf of children" and is
inspired as well by the realization that "the year 1979 will be the
twentieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child
and could serve as an occasion [for furthering] its implementation.'' 2
It may initially be wondered why such a celebration was thought
necessary. Everyone who has recently cared to speak on the subject
agrees that the "rights" of children ought to be declared and, having
been declared, ought to be "advocated." This attitude is nothing
new for lawyers, who have always thought of themselves as advocates for the rights of any client population, including children.
Other professionals, however, have also come to describe their goals
and activities in terms of "rights" and "advocacy." A prominent
child psychiatrist, for example, propounds the elements of sound
child development as a "Bill of Rights for Children" which incorporates, inter alia, claims to be born healthy and wanted, to continuous and loving care at home and in school, to acquisition of intellectual and emotional skills for effective citizenship, and, not
least one suspects, to "Diagnostic, Treatment, and Rehabilitative
Care Through Facilities Which Are Appropriate to Children's
Special Needs." 3 Educators, for their part, have expressed concern
about rights for their students and urged recognition of such entitlements as a school "which is process conscious," "cultivates their
sense of identity," and provides as well "an explicit code of social
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; B.A., Harvard University, 1963; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1966; LL.M., Northwestern University, 1968.
1. United Nations Resolution 31/169, adopted Dec. 21, 1976, proclaims the year 1979 the
International Year of the Child. G.A. Res. 31/169, 1 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 74-75, U.N.
Doc. A/31/39 (1977).
2. Id. (footnote omitted). The Declaration of the Rights of the Child was adopted by United
Nations Resolution 1386 (XIV).
3. Berlin, We Advocate This Bill of Rights, in Advocacy for Child Mental Health 1, 5 (I.
Berlin ed. 1975).
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expectations."" Social workers likewise describe themselves as
occupying an advocacy role, particularly for abused or neglected
children who have been denied the "right" to a healthy home en-

vironment.I
The United Nations' call to arms on behalf of the child apparently
finds, therefore, everyone on one side, with no declared enemy to
conquer. It may then seem curious that, as the articles in this symposium plainly suggest, serious dispute concerning the social and
legal rights of children continues unabated and unresolved. Even a
cursory review of these disputes reveals, however, that whatever the
issue, neither side opposes the rights of children. On the contrary,
each insists that it and only it understands and proposes to serve the
interests of youth. "Rights of children" now occupies a position
held in a more devout age by religious categories such as "Christianity" and "God"; everyone is militantly in favor of the idea, but
only if correctly defined and properly observed in practice.
Such struggles for proprietorship of righteousness are often further confused by insistence upon proprietorship of some single term
denoting righteousness: one Christian sect usually opposed another
also calling itself Christian and, more generally, one group serving
God did so by annihilating another that was as persuaded of its service to Him. In such controversies, no sect was willing to clarify
matters by styling itself the party of the anti-Christ. In the same
tradition, dispute concerning the legal and social position of youth is
conducted by adversaries who commonly call themselves "advocates
for the rights of children." Each group believes that how to treat
children is of great importance and none could accept a label suggesting that it was in some way "anti-child." At the same time, these
various advocates for children's rights propose very different places
and programs for young people and start from very different sociopolitical premises. Accordingly, it is worth a moment to clarify the
principal competing views of children's rights and to examine the
premises of each.
THE "INTEGRATIVE" VIEW OF RIGHTS
One theory of the rights of children may be called "integrative"
for reasons that will become clear in the course of discussion. It is
appropriate to begin here because this theory is most frequently
4. Morse, The Schools and the Mental Healthof Children andAdolescents, in Advocacy for
Child Mental Health 158, 171, 172, 181 (. Berlin ed. 1975).
5. See Tappan, Juridical and Administrative Approaches to Children With Problems, in
Justice for the Child 144, 151 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
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adopted by professionals (other than lawyers) in responding to the
International Year of the Child and because it probably reflects the
primary intent of the United Nations Declaration establishing this
Year.
Take, as an example of this theory, the notion of children's rights
in connection with education. The United Nations Declaration of the
Rights of the Child proclaims the following:
Principle 7. The child is entitled to receive education, which shall
be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages. He
shall be given an education which will promote his general
culture, and enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to
develop his abilities, his individual judgment and his sense of
moral and social responsibility, and to become a useful member
of society. 6
This description of the child's right closely resembles the positions
taken by educators who consider themselves advocates for their
students and by mental health professionals and social workers in
declaring rights to a good home.' It may serve, accordingly, as a
paradigm of the integrative approach to the rights of children.
The most apparent aspect of this notion of rights is its association
with a duty on the part of others-specifically, a duty on the state to
provide education for a certain period and of a certain quality. In
this emphasis on duty, the educator's view of the rights of students is
consistent with most jurisprudential definitions. Salmond, for example, declares that "[w]hether [a person's] interest amounts to a right
depends on whether there exists with respect to it a duty imposed
upon any other person." 8 Following the same line, Hohfeld describes "rights" and "duties" as correlative terms, the one presupposing the other as a definitional matter. 9 It is clear that "right" in
this sense presupposes legal recognition and enforcement of the correlative duty.
Granted, some aspects of the right to education announced by
Principle 7 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child may not be
practically enforceable. Determining whether available education
will indeed "promote general culture" or "develop the student's individual judgment" is no easy task for courts. The same may be said
of deciding whether a given program both "promotes individual
judgment" and leads students to "acceptance of moral and social
6. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, U.N. Res. 1386 (XIV). G.A. Res. 31/169, supra
note 2, at n.84.
7. See text at notes 3-5 supra, and sources cited therein.
8. G. Salmond, Jurisprudence 261 (1lth ed. 1957).
9. W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 36-38 (1919).
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responsibilities." Surely, though, the requirement that a state provide free education is within the bounds of judicial enforcement and
qualifies as a right in the strict sense described above.
The United Nations' formulation of the child's right does not end,
however, with creation of a governmental duty to provide education.
It presumes not only that obligation, but also a corresponding duty
on the child to accept the benefits of that right. Education is to be
"compulsory" quite as much as it is to be "free," and both elements
are part of the definition of the right itself.
The theory of "rights" embodied in the United Nations Declaration evidently is founded on a conviction about the needs of
children, rather than their desires. In this respect, the Declaration
further typifies the views held by many educators, social workers,
mental health professionals, and even juvenile court judges in advocating children's rights, a fact that further confirms its paradigmatic
value. For example, a child is entitled to psychiatric services because
he needs them, not because he wants them. Social workers make
their services available to and intervene on behalf of neglected
children because, without that intervention, the children will not
develop properly. It is not supposed that the client has a right not to
become a ward of the court when that is necessary, however much he
may want to stay at home. In the same tradition, the juvenile court
has claimed to protect the child's "right . . .to custody."'" Judges
acted when parents failed to exercise appropriate supervision over
their young, and did so to supply the latter's right to care and control, notwithstanding the fact that, in the usual case, the child's most
urgent desire was to escape supervision.
A theory of rights that emphasizes needs rather than choice places
its primary emphasis upon the integration of persons into society.
That rights can serve an integrative function is revealed by a recent
comparison of western and socialist legal theory which suggests that
while "bourgeois" rights are "entitlements" conveying a measure of
personal autonomy, socialist rights are considered declarations of
public standards for desirable goals and behavior." "Socialist rights
are thus not weapons (which would imply potential hostility between
the individual and society) but rather like railroad tickets: they en10. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, II (Pa. 1839), seems to have originated the proposition
that "the basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to custody." This view, which takes the
physical and social dependency of youth as its legal status as well, has been frequently repeated
in discussions of traditional juvenile court jurisdiction. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967),
for a more recent presentation (and rejection) of the same theme.
11. Markovits, Socialist vs. Bourgeois Rights-An East-West German Comparison, 45 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 612,614-17 (1978).

Summer 1980]

MEANINGS OF RIGHTS OF CHILDREN

title the holder only to travel in the indicated direction."' 2 It goes
without saying that the "indicated direction" is a matter of societal
rather than individual choice.
The perspective described here as "socialist" bears an obvious
resemblance to the view of rights reflected in the United Nations
Declaration. The principal purpose of the right to education, at least
when joined with the element of compulsion, is not to provide
children with weapons against or distance from society, but rather to
require their exposure to knowledge, attitudes, and behavior patterns thought important by the society at large. As indoctrination
(without any pejorative sense) is a prime goal of socialist law,' 3 so it
is for the rights of western students with respect to their education.
It should be obvious that the rights urged by social workers,
mental health professionals, and the traditional juvenile court share
this integrative purpose. The importance of providing a "good
home" goes beyond simple physical care, ultimately resting on the
belief that proper rearing is essential to the child's development as a
valuable member of society. As a Pennsylvania court observed more
than one hundred years ago in upholding legislation providing for
institutionalization of wayward children:
The object of the charity is reformation, by training its inmates
to industry; by imbuing their minds with principles of morality
and religion; by furnishing them with means to earn a living;
and, above all, by separating them from the corrupting influence
of improper associates. To this end, may not the natural
parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of
it, be superseded by the parenspatriae, or common guardian of
the community? It is to be remembered that the public has a
paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge of its
members.'"
Rights to psychiatric care or treatment similarly are premised upon
an interest in bringing the patient into the community by making him
or her "normal," rather than in separating that person from society
or even in recognizing the validity of such a separation.
This integrative view of rights is hardly new to American thinking;
indeed, it may have been more powerful previously than it is now.
De Tocqueville insisted that the prevailing American political interest was in equality rather than in liberty or independence of
12. Id. at 615.
13. Id. at 623-24.
14. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). See generally Teitelbaum & Harris, Some
HistoricalPerspectiveson GovernmentalRegulation of Children and Parents,in Beyond Control: Status Offenders in the Juvenile Court I (L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977).
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mind. I5 A preference for equality ultimately means a desire to be like
rather than different from others, and further assumes strong agreement between those who want and those who have about what is
desirable and good. It was precisely this readiness to agree with
others that, in de Tocqueville's view, led to a "tyranny of the
majority" which left Americans with less independence of mind and
opportunity for dissent than their Europeans cousins. I6
Although the integrative theory of rights has legitimate roots in
the early nineteenth century, it received its most comprehensive expression toward the end of that century and throughout the Progressive era. Progressive doctrine was directed to the pursuit of
man's perfectibility, promised during the Enlightenment, 7 through
elimination of those social institutions that had corrupted men.
Government would assume the responsibility of substituting new institutions designed to recognize and facilitate human progress.' 8 So
ambitious an undertaking required an agreed-upon social program
and massive resources for its execution; conditions that society was
prepared and anxious to satisfy.
The impact of Progressive theory on notions of right and on the
place of children in society cannot be overstated, although we have
ordinarily taken it for granted. Educators saw clearly, for example,
that education could not safely be left to parents, many of whom
were themselves uneducated and most of whom were lacking in
knowledge of how education should be conducted."' Accordingly,
the function of education was assumed by the state in order that
children might progress beyond their parents' condition. Public
schools would do "systematically and in a large, intelligent, and
competent way what for various reasons can be done in most households only in a comparatively meager and haphazard manner." 0
Social reformers were concerned, as Americans had been since the
15. On the distinction between the desire for equality and that for liberty in democratic
nations, see A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 310 (H.S. Commager ed. 1947).
I think that democratic communities have a natural taste for freedom: left to
themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and view any privation of it with regret.
But for equality, their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible: they
call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for
equality in slavery. They will endure poverty, servitude, barbarism-but they
will not endure aristocracy.
16. Id. at 164.
17. See C. Brinton, Ideas and Men 368-408 passim (1950) for an overview of the Enlightenment promise and program.
18. See Teitelbaum & Harris, supranote 14, at 25.
19. See, e.g., J. Dewey, The School and Society 47-53 (1900), quoted in 2 Children and
Youth in America 1117 (R. Bremner ed. 1971).
20. Id. at 1119.
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eighteenth century,2 ' that immigrant families brought with them attitudes and behavior patterns that obstructed the child's entry into
the American political community.2" Partial responses to this problem had been attempted during the nineteenth century; 3 however,
the Progressives proposed a comprehensive solution through creation of the juvenile court, which was intended to place children on
the road to "good, sound, adult citizenship" when their parents
could not do so. 2 ' A spokesman for the child guidance movement
summarized the thrust of this Progressive program in declaring that
"[o]ld functions of child welfare and training have passed over into
the hands of sociologists, psychiatrists, physicians, home economists
and other scientists dealing with problems of human welfare."" 5
Thus, just as economic production became an industry and the
worker a dependent, so knowledge of child-rearing was industrialized and parents and children left dependent." Public involvement
with respect to education and socialization was viewed as a governmental duty and, correlatively, it came to be said that the child
possessed a "right" to those things that the government undertook
to provide. Compulsory public education laws created a "right" to
schooling on the part of children; child labor laws were described as

21. Concern regarding the immigrants who came to this country was intense by the middle
of the eighteenth century. In 1753, Benjamin Franklin expressed the belief that "[t]he German
arrivals were 'the most stupid of their nation,' and would not take instruction from clergy or
society." R. Hofstadter, America at 1750: A Social Portrait 22 (1973). Concern was expressed
continually over the capacity of immigrants to discharge familial responsibilities throughout
the rest of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. See Teitelbaum & Harris, supra note 14,
at 16-17.
22. A leading penologist at the turn of the century observed that juvenile delinquency in this
country was substantially related to "the boundless hospitality of [our] shores." W. Morrison,
Juvenile Offenders 22 (1897), quoted in A. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency 37 (1969). Judge Julian Mack, one of the leaders of the juvenile court movement,
observed that "[m]ost of the children who come before the [juvenile] court are, naturally, the
children of the poor. In many cases the parents are foreigners, frequently unable to speak
English, and without an understanding of American methods and views." Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 116-17 (1909).
23. The house of refuge movement, the creation of children's aid societies and similar
developments were among the early efforts to deal with family failure from whatever source,
and particularly from the inadequacies of immigrant families. See, e.g., New York Children's
Aid Society, First Annual Report 3-6 (1854), quoted in I Children and Youth in America
420-21 (R. Bremner ed. 1970); Labaree, The Education Demanded by the Peculiar Character
of Our Civil Institutions, in The Lectures Delivered Before the American Institute of Instruction, 1849, 33-35 (1850), in id. at 457-58.
24. Mack, The Chancery Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in The Child, the Clinic and the
Court 310, 311-12 (J. Addams ed. 1925).
25. Glover & Dewey, Children of the New Day 48, quoted in C. Lasch, Haven in a Heartless
World 18 (1977).
26. See Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World 12-21 (1977).
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assuring the young person's "right to a prolonged infancy.""
Similarly, youths who misbehaved or whose parents failed to exercise appropriate supervision were viewed as children who had "lost
or. .. never known the fundamental rights of childhood to parental shelter, guidance, and control.""8 The court existed to provide
these lost rights.
There is an obvious relationship between these Progressive
"rights" and the emphasis upon equality that has traditionally
characterized American political thought. Both are principally concerned with providing all citizens with the prospect for improvement
by eliminating obstacles to and providing guidance along the path to
community membership. Both notions are also related to socialist
doctrine as it was described above. Rights to education and juvenile
court intervention, for example, are neither intended nor usable as
weapons against society; rather to return to a metaphor suggested
above, they provide young citizens with a ticket to full membership
in society and to equal participation in its progress. There is nothing
surprising in this similarity between traditional American and
socialist theories of the relationship between law and social development. Both find common roots in Enlightenment theory, supposing
the existence of a capacity for improvement in the human condition.
Both likewise find in social institutions the cause of misery, although
they differ as to the nature of those causes. And both have come to
rely on governmental intervention for elimination of corrupting conditions. One commentator on the Soviet legal system has observed
that "[a]t the present moment, Soviet polity represents perhaps the
only social milieu in which the idea of inexorable progress provides a
motive force for social action." ' 9 If this is so, it is true only to the extent that Americans have lost confidence in the Progressive ideal and
have preferred other values in defining the relationship between
citizen and state.
THE "AUTONOMOUS" VIEW OF RIGHTS
Rights of the kind described as "integrative" plainly imply
nothing in the way of choice on the part of the rightholder; as applied to children, their principal thrust is in quite the other direction.
Compulsory education and child labor laws were justified in great
27. See, e.g., Verplanck, Shortening the Period of Infancy, 27 Educ. Rev. 406-09 (1904),
quoted in 2 Children and Youth in America 650 (R. Bremner ed. 197 l).
28. Van Waters, The Juvenile Court from the Child's Viewpoint, in The Child, the Clinic
and the Court 217, 218 (J.Addams ed. 1925).
29. K. Grzybowski, Soviet Legal Institutions 6 (1962).
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part by the desire to prevent children from becoming financially or
socially independent before they were ready for that; jurisdiction
over "incorrigible" children likewise sought to deter premature
assertions of freedom from control. The "path" upon which the
community was to travel had many branches that led to quicksand
and were, therefore, closed to public use.
There is, however, a different notion of "rights," the nature of
which is suggested by de Tocqueville's concern for the "tyranny of
the majority" and was most eloquently articulated by John Stuart
Mill in his classic statement of libertarian doctrine:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection. . . . [T]he only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right. . . . The only part of the conduct
of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. 10
This notion of right, which emphasizes the area of autonomy and
choice of persons in society, is not that of the Progressive period. It
condemns both official and social compulsion that requires persons
to better themselves or to choose a particular direction for their
careers, except where injury to others is possible. A right in the sense
of liberty is, if not a sword, at least a shield against society and
serves a distancing rather than an integrative function.
The view of rights as providing a sphere of autonomy and freedom from control has antecedents in law as well as in political
theory. Holland's Jurisprudencesuggests that "[i]f. . .the power
of the State will protect [the person] in so carrying out his wishes,
and will compel such acts or forbearances on the part of other people
as may be necesary in order that his wishes may be so carried out,
then he has a 'legal right' so to carry out his wishes." 3 More important is the circumstance that rights viewed as guarantees of autonomy lie at the origins of the Federal Constitution. The fundamental
principles of that document derive largely from eighteenth century
30. Mill, On Liberty, in The Utilitarians 475,484 (1961).
31. T. Holland, Jurisprudence 86 (12th ed. 1916).
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views in which individual rights were considered natural and even
antecedent to government.3 2 When the people adopted the Constitution, they retained their autonomy and individual liberties against
the government, which was expected to protect those freedoms. "It
was," in Professor Henkin's words, "not to be the business of the
government to promote the 'welfare state' variety of welfare for the
individual, but to leave the individual free to seek it himself." 3 3
With varying degrees of strength, the Supreme Court has also
viewed claims of right as liberty interests. One way to look at the
substantive due process cases prior to 1936 is in terms of the Court's
effort to protect what it saw as matters of individual choice against
state regulations that were inspired by Progressive theory and
designed to protect individuals against both others and themselves.
Although maximum hours legislation might well have been described as creating a "right" to decent working conditions and
minimum wage legislation as establishing a "right" to decent wages,
cases involving the validity of such laws were not seen in this way by
the Court. Rather, questions were posed entirely in terms of the extent to which a state could limit rights, and particularly the freedom
employees. Thus, the
of contractual choice, held by employers and
34
York:
New
v.
Lochner
in
itself
asked
Court
Is [the statute setting maximum hours for bakery employees] a
fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of
the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty
or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may
seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself
and his family?"
Because the majority found that the maximum hours provision did
not serve any substantial governmental health or safety purpose, it
held the statute to be an unconstitutional invasion of contractual
liberty. The same fate was accorded other Progressive programs,
such as legislation prohibiting "yellow-dog" contracts 36 and establishing minimum wages for children."
32. Henkin, Constitutional Rights and Human Rights, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 593,
595-97 (1978). A shorter discussion of the same views is found in Henkin, Rights: American
and Human, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 405 (1979).
33. Henkin, ConstitutionalRights and Human Rights, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 593, 599
(1978),
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
35. Id. at 56.
36. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). "Yellow-dog" contracts contained a provision
requiring the employee not to join or remain a member of a labor organization during the
period of his employment.
37. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). But see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
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Starting about 1936, however, the Court adopted, under considerable pressure, a more cautious approach to its function in
reviewing state legislation, thereby permitting and sometimes approving governmental activity designed to improve the lot of citizens
independently of their desires in the matter.38 Recently a somewhat
greater readiness to recognize claims of individual liberty and rights
of choice has re-emerged, although inconsistently. Decisions establishing the right to counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination are directly or indirectly intended to allow the accused
to assert a distance from society by requiring the state to prove his
guilt without his cooperation in that enterprise." Claims involving
freedom of speech express the same insistence upon distance from
official (and sometimes unofficial) regulation. Various rights of
privacy in making important choices concerning one's person and
affairs have also been developed over the last decade." Each of these
claims involves in some degree a Millsian notion of liberty, joined
with either suspicion or rejection of governmental definitions of
what is good and desirable conduct. From such a perspective, it is
hard to see the United Nations Declaration as creating a "right" to
education since, for every suit brought by a child to secure education, there are fifty or five hundred truancy proceedings brought
against children by public authorities which presuppose that the
respondents have no claim to autonomy regarding their education.
It might be expected that the development of a strong interest in
liberty would be confined to claims by adults-a limitation that even
Mill would have accepted."1 Children are, after all, ordinarily and
412 (1908), upholding an Oregon law forbidding the employment of women in factories or
laundries for more than ten hours per day. See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
38. E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (effectively overruling Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (effectively
overruling Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
39. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,47 (1967):
The roots of the privilege [against self-incrimination] ... tap the basic stream of
religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon
the equality of the individual and the state. . . . One of its purposes is to
prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of
the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction. (footnotes omitted).
40. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Mill qualified his statement of the fundamental principle of individual liberty in the
following way: "It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only
to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young
persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood." Mill, On
Liberty, in The Utilitarians 475,484 (1961).
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for good reason considered dependent rather than independent
social actors, whose need for special care and guidance is at variance
with demands for freedom on their part. Nevertheless, the view of
rights as grants of autonomy has been recognized even for minors.
The earliest and clearest instance of this development is found in
connection with juvenile court proceedings. As we have already
seen, the juvenile court was a typical creation of Progressive
thought."' It was designed to provide children with "rights" to
proper upbringing and intervened when parents could or would not
discharge that function. Judges for this court were to be knowledgeable in sociology, psychology, race relations, and other fields
relevant to child guidance, as well as in law. 3 Moreover, the court
had available to it the expertise of the newly risen social work profession. The juvenile court was thus viewed as an agency for providing
help and guidance to children in need, and not as a forum for the
resolution of conflict. It was assumed that all participants shared a
common interest in serving the best interests of the child and, accordingly, that there was neither substantive nor procedural adversity between them. This assumption of unity of interest was reflected
in informal procedures, typically conducted without particular
regard to rules of evidence and without the presence of counsel. Forimpediment to the juvenile court process and
mality was seen as an
44
its therapeutic goals.

In 1967, this vision was seriously impaired by a Supreme Court
decision, In re Gault,4 5 holding that children faced with delinquency
42. See text at notes 24, 28 supra.
43. Judge Miriam Van Waters described the qualifications for a juvenile court referee as
follows:
In the training of a woman referee of the Juvenile Court sound legal knowledge
is essential, particularly of the law of evidence and principles of the laws relating
to the protection of minors and women and all that pertains to domestic relations. Knowledge of psychology, mental hygiene, sociology and anthropology,
at least those branches of anthropology that deal with criminology, and racial
traits and capacities is much to be desired. The referee should have had training
in social work, in the elements of the case-method and in the practical field of
probation. She should have imagination and a sense of humor and a genuine love
of youth.
Van Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure, 13 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 61,
63(1922).
44. The desideratum [in juvenile court] is to obtain, by the use of kindness and sympathy, the confidence of the child and of its parents if possible, to convince them
that the judge and probation officer are friends and not the avengers of offended
law. Good results are far more likely to be obtained in this way by the use of informal methods than by bringing them into a court conducted with the form and
ceremony attendant upon trials for crime, where all the proceedings suggest that
the law is about to be invoked to inflict punishment upon hardened malefactors.
State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 510, 167 N.W. 830, 832 (1918). See also Lindsey, The Juvenile
Court ofDenver, in Children's Courts in the United States 28, 107 (S.Barrows ed. 1904).
45. 387 U.S. 1(1967).
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proceedings were entitled to the right to counsel, notice of charges,
confrontation of witnesses, and the privilege against self- incrimination. In the first place, the Court found that children possessed a
liberty interest in connection with these proceedings and, in so
holding, expressly rejected the traditional view that the juvenile's
right is to custody rather than liberty. 6 The Court also held that a
child is entitled to claim a privilege against self- incrimination, not
only because youthful confessions may be untrustworthy but
because children charged with delinquency, like adults charged with
crime, are entitled to decide whether to assist the state in securing
their conviction.
It is hard to imagine any proposition that would contradict the integrative view of a child's rights in the juvenile court more centrally
than this last. To recognize a right to resist the state in its efforts to
provide assistance is to deny the philosophical foundation upon
which the court was established. Moreover, the Supreme Court went
on to impeach a number of other assumptions held by traditional
juvenile court and Progressive theorists concerning intervention on
behalf of youth. In particular, the notions that expertise would
routinely provide constructive opportunities for children and that
enlightened goals would accurately guide official discretion were
subjected to grave question, if not rejection. Industrial schools and
reformatories were found to resemble prisons quite as much as they
did educational institutions,4' and the efforts of judges and probation officers to result not in enlightened decisions about the needs of
children but in unfair factual determinations and inappropriate
prescriptions of treatment. 9
This shift toward recognizing liberty interests for children has appeared in other areas where Progressive theory would have supported only integrative rights. David Rothman has contrasted the
postures of students facing authority years ago and today. "Having
broken some rule or other, a rule which we had probably learned of
through an informal student network, we shuffled into the dean's
office, sheepishly, head hanging. We told our story, bringing up
every exculpatory fact we could imagine, and then sat back hoping
for the best. The dean pronounced the punishment, and, mumbling
our apologies, we more or less backed out of the office."5 0 Such
times, as he observes, are over, and not only at the college level. The
46. Id. at 27-29.
47. Id. at 47.
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 18-20.
50. Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the ProgressiveEra, in Doing Good:
The Limits of Benevolence 69, 85 (1978).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

Supreme Court has held that children possess a liberty interest in attending schools that cannot be compromised without at least an informal hearing, 5 which often enough is attended by legal counsel
and encompasses questions of proof and appropriateness of disposition. This decision plainly reveals that the trust formerly placed in
the administrative discretion of experts has been sharply reduced 2
and suggests as well that children stand independently of their custodians for some purposes.
Claims of autonomy on behalf of children have even been recognized within that distinctively cooperative enterprise, the family.
The Supreme Court has squarely held that mature minors possess an
interest in deciding important questions concerning child-bearing,
and particularly that a state law allocating to parents the abortion
decision unconstitutionally invades an area of personal privacy
possessed by children.IS Assuming maturity and knowledge, whether
the child is wise in her decision to have an abortion is of no importance; 4 the decision is hers to make as a matter of constitutionally-protected choice.
The extent of the Supreme Court's commitment to values of
autonomy rather than integration is, however, a variable matter. A
recent pair of cases involving the right of parents to institutionalize
their children as mentally ill or retarded illustrates the continuing
tension between these values. 5 5 The general question in these cases
was whether parents may "voluntarily" commit their minor children
to mental health facilities with the concurrence of a doctor but
without any hearing concerning the accuracy of the diagnosis or
treatment decision. Arrayed on one side of the question are the protective interests of the parents and the mental health profession,
both claiming benevolent motivations and the expertise necessary to
treat children who need help. On the other side is the nature of confinement in a mental health facility, which has been described by the
Supreme Court as a "massive curtailment of liberty" for adults, 6
requiring a substantial showing of need when coercively imposed. 57
51. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(liberty interest under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require
notice or a hearing before the disciplinary paddling of a student).
52. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 579-80.
53. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Bellotti v.
Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
54. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3048.
55. Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
56. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,509 (1972); see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975).
57. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).

Summer 1980]

MEANINGS OF RIGHTS OF CHILDREN

Moreover, liberty interests in freedom from institutional confinement have been expressly recognized for children, even where such
confinement is intended to serve therapeutic purposes.I
The Court's resolution of the commitment cases says much about
the difficulty of reconciling autonomous and integrative values, but
little about how that was or might be done. On the one hand, it was
held that children have a "substantial liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment,"" 9 thereby suggesting
the continued vitality of one line of authority described above. The
child's interest was routinely discussed, however, in qualified terms
and was little emphasized in the majority opinion.6" On the other
hand, the Court devoted considerable attention to parental interests
respecting the institutionalization of their children and to the
reliability of professional judgments concerning commitment, ultimately holding that protection of the child's interests was fully
satisfied by concurrence between parent and doctor regarding the
minor's confinement.
It is unclear whether this conclusion rests upon the notion that the
child's interest in freedom is really not very great or the belief that
the risk of erroneous institutionalization is small. At some points, it
seems as if the Court is holding that the minor's liberty interest is
qualified by an independent, constitutionally based interest in
parents to control their children's careers. 6 ' This would be a significant and even innovative doctrine. Although a number of previous
decisions refer to a parental right to decide what happens to their
children, 62 they have almost always involved arbitrary state intervention with respect to educational matters and, most significantly, efforts to impose official wisdom on an apparently united family. This
line of authority seemed most directly concerned with preserving
values of pluralism for the family unit. 63 A re-interpretation of
parental rights to assert a broad authority to remove children from
the home for substantial periods and take action profoundly affecting their futures without government supervision would sharply
58. E.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
59. Parham v. J.R., 99S. Ct. at 2503.
60. Id. The majority describes the child's interest, not in terms of liberty generally, but as an
interest in freedom from unnecessary confinement, and strongly suggests that concerns about
labeling and stigmatization are of little importance.
61. Id. at 2504-05.
62. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
63. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their
Application, 12 Fam. L.Q. 153, 166-74 (1978).
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limit the rights of minors6" and raise hard questions about the proper
scope of laws seeking to protect children from potentially harmful
parental acts.
Although this sometimes appears to reflect the majority's approach,6 there are also reasons to doubt that the Court meant to
create a wide ambit of independent parental rights. For one thing,
parental rights are described at several points as resting on a
"presumption" that parents will act in their children's best interests. 66 This suggests that the notion of parental rights is derived
from a governmental delegation of authority, which the Court finds
to be justified. Such a right is not, of course, an independent source
of limitation on the child's liberty interests. For another, the clear
holding of the majority is that a state may adopt a hearing procedure
for commitment if it thinks that to be desirable, although it need not
do so as a constitutional matter. 7 Were parents independently entitled to determine their children's treatment, imposition of procedures substantially burdening their decision would be closely questioned if not prohibited. And, finally, it should be noted that even
where the state has no hearing procedure, the Court finds a constitutional requirement of review and concurrence by a medical professional in the parents' proposal for commitment. 6 8
This last point may explain much about the commitment cases and
their lack of expressed concern for the child's liberty. It is ultimately
not the parents upon whom reliance is most heavily placed, but the
doctors who review the commitment request. The majority opinion
seems to return to the Progressive period's confidence in the expertise of professionals. It plainly adopts the proposition that a physician, including one employed by the receiving institution, is a
"neutral factfinder" whose established medical procedures may be
trusted to eliminate the risk of erroneous or unnecessary confine64. If the parents have an independent constitutional right to control, for example, the
child's choice of companions, summer employment, or the like, the child's liberty in these
areas is necessarily extinguished vis-a-vis parental decisions. One cannot have a right to do
something and a duty not to do the same thing.
65. See Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. at 2505, where the majority suggests that its cases involving arbitrary state education laws would have been decided the same way if the children had indicated a desire to follow the state laws in question (i.e., learn English rather than German or
attend public rather than parochial schools). The Court does not address the question of how
pluralism would be served by requiring children to abandon their own interests in education,
apparently establishing thereby a new "parental rights" interest in deciding upon appropriate
education for minors.
66. Id. at 2505.
67. "It is not necessary that the deciding physician conduct a formal or quasi-formal hearing. A state is free to requiresuch a hearing, but due process is not violated by use of informal
traditional medical investigative techniques." Id. at 2507 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 2506.
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ment. 6" The Court indeed goes some distance out of its way to mention sympathetically the American Psychiatric Association's complaint that hearings in such matters divert professional attention
from treatment to intake procedures."
Further, if indirect, support for the conclusion that neither
children's nor parents' interests play the major part in the commitment cases comes from another Supreme Court decision reached two
weeks later. 7 As we have seen, the Court had already held that
parents do not have independently, and may not be delegated, an absolute veto over a mature minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy."' In this recent case, the Court considered the situation of
pregnant children too immature to decide themselves about abortion, and held that a trial court, rather than either parent or child,
must decide whether an abortion should be performed. 3 No presumption of parental wisdom seemed to operate in this area. Despite
what seems an obvious relationship between the issues of children's
liberty and parental control presented by the commitment and abortion cases, the abortion opinion ignores the former;" only a
reference to the supposedly unique character of abortion offers any
doctrinal basis for reconciling these decisions." There is, however, a
non-doctrinal thread that links the two lines of decision. Both civil
commitment and a court's decision regarding abortion will ultimately rest on a doctor's professional judgment concerning the
appropriateness of the course sought, 6 and this judgment serves as
69. Id. at 2506-07.
70. Id. at 2506.
71. 99S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
72. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
73. 99 S.Ct. at 3048.
74. Bairdcites Parham only once, and then with an introductory Cf. signal, at the end of a
string citation concerning the existence of a constitutional parental right against adverse interference by the state. 99 S. Ct. at 3046 n.18.
75. The Court in Bellotti v. Baird states that the consequences of denying an abortion are
"grave and indelible," and that delay in the procedure inevitably prejudices the decision
against the minor. 99 S. Ct. at 3047-48. This, it is suggested, makes the abortion decision
unique. However, there is ample reason to think that confinement in a mental institution for
most of a child's formative years may have grave and indelible effects-probably as grave as
those associated with bearing an unwanted child. See Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 63, at
186-97. And, while a brief delay in review of commitment (unlike abortion) decisions may not
be critical, the Court's decision in Parham allows delay until the person confined reaches
majority. By that time, all effects associated with the action will surely have taken place and
the child prejudiced by any error in the commitment decision. The basis for considering abortion sui generis seems, therefore, obscure.
76. Although, as a practical matter, both decisions will rest largely on a doctor's judgment,
the rationales for that reliance are not consistently expressed by the Court. In Parham, the
majority insists that "[t]he mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the
business of judges. What is best for the child is an individual medical decision that must be left
to the judgment of physicians in each case." 99 S.Ct. at 2507. In Bellotti v. Baird, by contrast,
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the practical basis for resolving questions about the welfare of
minors. To this extent at least, there seems to have been an unacknowledged but substantial withdrawal from earlier decisions emphasizing the independence of young persons in favor of renewed
reliance on Progressive values.
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the rights of children is part of a more
general conflict between integrative and libertarian views of rights.
Both views have always commanded adherents, and both have been
subject to questioning and qualification. From one perspective, the
demand for autonomy reflects a loss of sense of community or, in
Daniel Bell's phrase, of civitas." Government through social conformity surely has its uses, particularly in a society such as ours that
prefers to avoid direct physical force and coercion. David Potter
once observed that "[e]very society has to have ways of coordinating
the activities of its members, and this means that it has to have ways
of inducing individuals to behave in ways they may not wish to
behave and to do things which they would prefer not to do." 8 The
"voluntary" acceptance of such coordination is what has been called
"socialization," 7 9 and may also be the root meaning of civilization.
If cooperation cannot be accomplished through general agreement
with societal goals the alternative may be greater resort to demands
for "obedience" and more frequent imposition of external force.
From another perspective, however, the distancing from society
revealed by the demand for autonomy may be a necessary reaction to
unfounded claims of Progressive ideology and practice. It is hard
now to accept uncritically the assumptions behind compulsory
education, juvenile court intervention, and a variety of other programs for social betterment. We simply know too much about the influence of bureaucratic operation on program development and staff
the Court considers the decision a judicial one, but here judicial determination is placed in opposition to parental decision-making. Although the latter opinion does not specify what goes
into a determination of the child's "best interests," surely there must be a doctor available who
thinks the decision to terminate the pregnancy medically wise and, in all likelihood, other professional evidence concerning the psychological desirability of that course. It is difficult to
believe that trial judges will not be heavily and routinely governed by these opinions.
77. "The major difficulty [of post-industrial society] is two-fold: Western society lacks both
civitas, the spontaneous willingness to make sacrifices for some public good, and a political
philosophy that justifies the normative rules of priorities and allocations in the society."
D. Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism 25 (1976).
78. Potter, Changing Patterns of Social Cohesion and the Crisis of Law Under a System of
Government by Consent, in Is Law Dead? 260, 272-73 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
79. See id. at 273; C. Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World 3-4 (1977).
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assignment, the shortcomings of institutions within the juvenile
justice system, and the inadequacies of the mental health process to
have unquestioning confidence in such programs. If acceptance of
traditional claims of competence by these agencies is the price of
restoring cooperation, that price may be too high. Moreover, it requires an innocence that, once lost, may be impossible to recapture.
More positively, the rejection of socialization as the dominant
mode of political activity may be a form of progress toward a more
democratic principle of action-one that requires public and express
justification for any limitation imposed upon individual action. As
de Tocqueville and Mill recognized, the "tyranny of the majority" is
a genuine obstacle to independent choice and, to the extent that
tyranny of this sort rests upon agreed goals and programs, the
weakening of that agreement may also weaken the hold of majoritarian views on individuals.
These contradictions have special significance when notions of
rights are applied to young persons. Neither theory is legally or
socially inappropriate to children; indeed, both are explicitly incorporated within every view of proper child-rearing. On the one
hand, it is expected that children will be acculturated; that is, they
will learn cultural values in general and conform their conduct to
social rules in particular. They must, in short, become knowledgeable members of the community. At the same time, the end point of
these processes is adulthood, upon which the child becomes a full
citizen who must have developed a capacity for choice and autonomous action. Failure in either direction is a most serious matter. A
child who does not learn social values and rules cannot join the
society in which he must live; a person without capacity for independent choice cannot usefully participate in that society. S0 It is impossible to say that an integrative view of rights, which is designed to ensure that socialization occurs, can be abandoned, and it is equally
impossible to say, in a society which values individual liberty, that
children may claim no liberty interest until they have reached the age
of majority. The tension between the opposing views of rights of
children cannot finally be eliminated. It is, however, useful to
understand the different functions served by these views so that
choices are made on the basis of premises rather than labels.

80. See Katz & Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of
Law, 53 Ind. L.J. 1, 17-18 (1977-1978).

